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ABSTRACT: A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the 
phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. In this paper, 
I consider an alternative I call Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal 
character outruns content. It does so because the intentional mode contributes to the 
phenomenal character of the experience. Here I assess phenomenal contrast arguments 
in support of this view. I argue that the phenomenal contrast cases appealed to allow for 
interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically 
manifest aspects of experience. 
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Intentionalist views in the philosophy of mind come in several varieties. However, all such 
views are fundamentally concerned with the question of what it is about experience that 
determines what-it-is-like. In other words, Intentionalist views of all stripes provide an answer 
to the question of what properties or features of experience determine its phenomenal 
character. It is principally in the details of their answers to this question that varieties of 
Intentionalism differ. This paper considers a phenomenal contrast argument for the view that 
two things determine the phenomenal character of intentional experience, namely intentional 
content and intentional mode. I call this view Mode Intentionalism. My central claim is that this 
argument does not successfully motivate the view.    
The cases I discuss are sense-perceptual experiences. Part of the motivation for this 
restriction is that they are the paradigm case of intentional experiences, as personal level 
mental states which (relatively) non-controversially exhibit both intentionality and 
phenomenal character. So, if we want to understand the relation between the intentional and 
the phenomenal, then sense-perceptual experiences are an excellent place to start. Given this, 
I don’t consider how the claims that follow map onto intentional experience per se.  
Let me note, however, that the above restriction means that I won’t be considering 
arguments of behalf of Mode Intentionalism which draw on putatively non-content based 
 2 
phenomenal contrasts among cognitive intentional experiences with (supposed) cognitive 
phenomenology. These could be contrasts between: (i) conscious thoughts (e.g. contrasts 
between judging that P and wondering that P); (ii) conscious thoughts and imaginations (e.g. 
consciously thinking that the Eiffel Tower has a certain colour vs consciously imagining that the 
Eiffel Tower has that colour); or (iii) across imaginative states themselves – although I do 
consider a contrast between sense-perception and imagistic memory. Certain important works 
in the literature do seek to motivate views approximating to Mode Intentionalism in such 
ways.1 A comprehensive case against Mode Intentionalism would, therefore, have to deal with 
such cases. Given this, the more limited conclusion offered in this paper is that the kinds of 
arguments considered here do not sufficiently motivate Mode Intentionalism about sense-
perceptual experience. I save consideration of whether the relevant style of phenomenal 
contrast arguments might support Mode Intentionalism about cognitive intentional 
experiences for a separate occasion. 
Note, what follows is also in certain respects a limited defence of a Strong Intentionalist 
position – that phenomenal character is exclusively determined by intentional content – 
against Mode Intentionalism. Although this should be seen primarily as a via negativa, in the 
sense of making an indirect case for Strong Intentionalism by showing that an alternative view 
is implausible.  
The road for the paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines minimal intentionalist 
commitments, distinguishes Intentionalist views, and clarifies Mode Intentionalism. Section 
2 presents the phenomenal contrast argument for Mode Intentionalism. Section 3 then 
considers a critical response to it. Section 4 shows that the Mode Intentionalist’s responses to 
the criticisms levelled fail to convince. Finally, section 5, considers an associated view I call 
Intentionalism about Modes, explaining how it relates to the issues considered in the previous 
sections. 
 
																																																						
1 See Horgan and Tienson 2002: 520-33; Siewert 2011: 236-267. 
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1. Intentionalism and Mode Intentionalism  
1.1 Minimal Commitments and Varieties of Intentionalism 
All Intentionalist views take on board minimal commitments. The most basic is that conscious 
experiences exhibit a form of directedness towards their objects, where objects can be 
understood in the broad sense as covering physical particulars, persons, events, and states of 
affairs involving these things – as the target or focus of the experience. The so-called 
‘Intentional Object’ of the experience is therefore given in answers to questions of the form 
‘what is your experience about’ or ‘what is your mind directed toward’.2 Further to this, 
intentional experiences do not present bare particulars. Rather they present their objects 
under specific aspects – what some call the aspectual shape of the experience.3 For example, 
a visual experience of a physical particular, say of a desk, does not merely present the desk per 
se, but presents it as being thus and so, as being a determinate way; for example, as looking a 
certain shade of brown. It is on this basis that the experience has accuracy conditions.  
Combining these points, we can formulate a minimal notion of intentional content: the 
object presented, as it presented to the subject under a specific aspect. This notion of 
intentional content, which I paraphrase as manifest content, is a first-person phenomenological 
notion. It is intended to capture at least partly, how things seem from the subject’s 
perspective.4 Note, this minimal notion does not take a stand on whether the relevant object, 
so presented under determinate aspects in intentional experience, has a propositional 
structure. I find it implausible that the manifest content of sense-perceptual experience (at 
least) has the structure of a proposition, singular or otherwise, but this issue will not concern 
me here.5  
																																																						
2 We can remain neutral on complex issues concerning intentional objects, i.e. whether they are objects 
in the ordinary sense (see Searle 1983: 18; 117), or whether we need some intentional inexistence claim 
(see Crane 2001: 13-18 for discussion).  
3 See Searle 1985: 12-13, 52; 1992: 155-7; Crane 2000: 3; 2001: 18-22; 2003: 7-8.  
4 See Siegel 2010: Ch.2 for a similarly minimal notion of content. 
5 See Crane 2009b: 452-469. 
 4 
Let me now explain how such commitments relate to phenomenal character. As noted in 
the Introduction, Intentionalist views seek to answer the question of what determines the 
phenomenal character of experience. However, so understood, the question is ambiguous. 
We can read it metaphysically: ‘what is it that metaphysically determines the phenomenal 
character of experience’, where these might be features of experience beyond the subject’s 
ken (i.e. not necessarily capturing how things seem from the subject’s perspective). 
Alternatively, we can read it phenomenologically: ‘what captures how things are experientially for 
the subject, or how it is with me’.6 As I will be understanding Intentionalism, such views seek 
(first and foremost) to provide an answer to the latter question. They seek to specify what-it-
is-likeness in terms of properties of experience that are, as I will put it, phenomenologically 
manifest, where this is taken to mean is a part of the phenomenology of the experience that a 
sufficiently attentive subject could (at least in principle) pick out — introducing the notion of 
intentional content as manifest content reflects this commitment.7  
Importantly though, ‘things’ in the phrase how things are with me (or ‘it’ in how it is with me 
or in what-it-is-likeness), need not be read as exclusively referring to how the object of the 
experience seems. That would prejudice in favour of the view – which I call Strong 
Intentionalism below – that manifest content exhaustively determines phenomenal character.8 
Before investigation we should not rule out whether ‘how things seem’ includes dimensions 
of intentional experience which are not to be equated with manifest content (e.g. the 
experience itself seeming a certain way). 
Given what we have said so far though, Intentionalist views commit to the claim that 
manifest content plays a role in determining the phenomenal character of experience. As such, 
changes or differences in the manifest content of an experience will typically be reflected in 
changes or differences in its phenomenal character. Compare two sequential visual 
experiences, had by the same subject, of an object which changes colour every 30 seconds. 
																																																						
6 See Martin 1998a: 157-79; Crane 2009a: 487. 
7 For further clarification of the notion of the phenomenologically manifest see Kriegel 2007: 115-136. 
8 See Crane 2009a: 484-6 (cf. Byrne: 2001: 199-240). 
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First, they have a visual experience of it as red, and then 30 seconds later as green. The first 
experience, E1 (at t1) has a manifest content approximating to <O as red>; the second, E2 
(at t2), <O as green>. The different visual experiences present the same intentional object 
under different aspects, where this amounts to its being experienced as having different 
observable colour properties. As such, the manifest content of E1 and E2 differ. Yet given 
this difference in manifest content, there will be a difference in phenomenal character; what-
it-is-like to have a visual experience of the object as red is different from what-it-is-like to have 
a visual experience of the object as green. So, manifest content to some extent determines the 
phenomenal character of experience.  
Here are three Intentionalist views which differ on the extent to which that is the case.  
 
Strong Intentionalism: The phenomenal character of an intentional experience is entirely 
determined by its manifest content. Phenomenal character does not outrun manifest 
content.9 
 
So, any difference in phenomenal character is necessarily a difference in manifest content – 
all phenomenal differences are manifest content differences. This can be expressed as the 
claim that phenomenal character supervenes on manifest content: no phenomenal difference 
without a difference in manifest content. I have more to say about Strong Intentionalism in 
what follows, but here are two alternatives. 
 
																																																						
9 Approximations of this view are defended by Dretske 1999; Tye 1995; 2000; 2002: 137-51; 2014: 39-
57; Harman: 1990 31-52; Byrne: 2001: 199-240. Although some of these authors have additional 
metaphysical commitments relating to the notion of content as representational content (see end of 
section). Angela Mendelovici (2013: 135-5) argues for Strong Intentionalism in the case of emotions 
and moods, and David Bain (2003: 502-23) does so in the case of pain. 
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Weak Intentionalism: The phenomenal character of an intentional experience is 
determined by its manifest content and non-intentional features (e.g. non-intentional 
qualia). Phenomenal character does outrun manifest content.10 
 
Weak Intentionalism would claim that differences in phenomenal character are not exhausted 
by changes in manifest content since the phenomenal character of an intentional experience 
is also determined by the relevant non-intentional qualia. I won’t have anything more to say 
about Weak Intentionalism, so understood. 
 
Mode Intentionalism: The phenomenal character of an intentional experience is 
determined by its manifest content and the intentional mode of the experience. 
Phenomenal character does outrun manifest content but does not outrun intentional 
structure.11 
 
Mode Intentionalism differs from Weak Intentionalism since it does not include any non-
intentional qualia in the determination of phenomenal character. It claims that the 
phenomenal character of an intentional experience is entirely determined by its intentional 
structure, where this includes more than just manifest content since it also includes the 
relevant intentional mode (see 1.2 for clarification).12  
																																																						
10 Qualia realists defend approximations of this view. See Block 1996: 19–49; 2003: 165-200; Burge 
2003: 405-15; Shoemaker 1996: ch.5, ch.6. Kind 2003: 225–244; Peacocke 1983 (see Dennett 1988; 
Martin 1998a: 157-79 for scepticism about non-intentional qualia; also see Crane 2003: sections 4 and 
5).   
11 See Crane 2000: 1-11; 2001: ch1; 2003: 1-27; 2009a: 474-491; Horgan and Tienson 2002; 520–33; 
Chalmers 2004: 153-181. A precursor to this view is arguably found in Searle 1983: 4-6, 12 and in 
Block’s notion of mental paint (see Block 1996: 19–49 2003: 165-200). Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni 
(2012) argue for a similar view for emotions.   
12 Crane originally describes the view I call Mode Intentionalism as ‘Strong Intentionalism’, contrasting 
it with ‘Strong Representationalism’, and later switches to ‘Impure Intentionalism’, contrasting this with 
‘Pure Intentionalism’ (see respectively, Crane 2001; Crane 2009a: 474-93; see also Chalmers 2004: 155). 
The latter contrast tracks my distinction between Strong Intentionalism and Mode Intentionalism. 
Ultimately the labels aren’t particularly important, as long as the substantive definitions and differences 
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Note, there is a further view in the vicinity of Mode Intentionalism which I will consider at 
pertinent points during this paper, and will discuss in detail in section 5 – namely what I will 
call Intentionalism about Mode. This view has it that the relevant intentional mode may not only 
make a phenomenological difference (such that phenomenal character is partly determined 
by mode), but also makes a difference to the intentional content of the relevant experience. 
In other words, Intentionalism about Mode commits to a special kind of ‘mode-infused’ content. 
I mention this view here to bring the reader’s attention to it, since it will be relevant to the 
discussion at certain points. Although Mode Intentionalism as defined above which is my primary 
focus in the following sections.  
As I have framed these varieties of Intentionalism, they are, to re-emphasise, 
phenomenological views in that they specify what-it-is-likeness in terms of properties, aspects, 
or features of experience that are phenomenologically manifest. Further to this, they operate 
with a notion of manifest content (and other relevant features of experience) that is not 
metaphysically committed. As such, they don’t require any specific metaphysics of content 
(i.e. psychosemantics). In that sense, Strong Intentionalism should not be confused with 
Externalist Representationalism, which commits to a specific view of the content-determining 
relation between the metaphysics and the phenomenology, namely an externalist one. On such 
views, what exhaustively determines the phenomenal character of experience is (like Strong 
Intentionalism) its intentional content. However, that content is a specific kind of 
representational content, where (a) features of that content need not be phenomenally 
manifest to the subject, and (b) that content is itself determined by a specific causal relation 
to the environment (for example, the tracking of environmental features).13 One could hold 
a Strong Intentionalist view, as I have framed it, without an externalist psychosemantics, or 
indeed any view of the determining relation between the metaphysics (of content) and the 
																																																						
are kept in mind. However, calling the view ‘Mode Intentionalism’ puts the distinctive claim at the 
forefront – that intentional modes contribute, along with manifest content, to determining the 
phenomenal character of intentional experience – so there is justification for the labels I have adopted.   
13 See Dretske 1999; Tye 1995; Harman: 1990: 31-52. 
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phenomenology. This will be all I say on this issue. The following sub-section clarifies Mode 
Intentionalism. 
 
1.2 Clarifying Mode Intentionalism 
First, we need to get clearer on intentional modes. Those advocating Mode Intentionalism 
typically specify them in terms of determinate types of experience.14 Importantly then, 
intentional modes should not be confused with modes of presentation which are one way of 
theorizing the aspectual dimension of intentional content (see section 3.1). For informative 
purposes, consider the class of propositional attitudes. Arguably thought per se, is a 
determinable, of which determinate attitudes are judging, hoping, wishing, wondering, expecting, etc. 
Simplifying, these are all transitive attitude verbs, which take (propositional) contents as 
sentential complements (e.g. judging that P, hoping that P, etc.). As such, we have a range of 
different propositional attitudes, which (on standard views) relate us to propositional 
contents. We can, therefore, make a distinction between the attitude and the content. 
It might similarly be suggested that sense-perceptual experience, or perceiving on the 
basis of the senses, is a determinable, of which the determinate intentional modes are (at least) 
vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch – although paradigmatic sensory experience is multimodal. 
The distinctive claim of Mode Intentionalism is that what determines the phenomenal 
character of an intentional experience is both that it has the manifest content it does and that 
it is the relevant type of experience it is – that it is in this intentional mode, rather than a 
different one. For example, what determines the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience is both the manifest content – the intentional object under the relevant aspect(s) 
– and that it is a visual experience.15 
																																																						
14 See Crane 2000: 1-11; 2001: 139; 2009: 474-491. See also Searle 1983: 4-6, 12; 1992; 129-132; 
Chalmers (2004) calls this feature the ‘manner of representation’ of the experience, and Husserl (2001) 
calls it ‘act-quality’.  
15 There is the further claim made by Crane that the structure of intentional states is relational, insofar 
as one is related to an intentional content on the basis of the relevant mode (see Crane 2001: 28-33; 
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However, Mode Intentionalism requires further clarification to avoid being merely a form 
of Strong Intentionalism. It must hold that the intentional mode is phenomenologically 
manifest.16 To make this clear, let me approach this issue from a different angle, namely that 
of intentional individuation. Given the minimal commitments of Intentionalist views, the 
manifest content of an intentional experience will have a central role in individuating the 
relevant mental state – that is in making it the experience it is, and differentiating it from other 
experiences. For Strong Intentionalism that role will be exhaustive: once we have fully 
specified the manifest content, there is no more that needs to be done to pick out the 
intentional experience as the experience it is. Mode Intentionalism disagrees. What 
individuates an intentional experience is both that it has the manifest content it does and that 
it is in the intentional mode it is.  
But if intentional individuation of this kind is intended to capture how things are from 
the subject’s perspective, such that the criteria for individuation should be available to the 
subject undergoing the experience, then intentional individuation in this context is phenomenal 
intentional individuation. In other words, it is a kind of individuation the grounds for which 
are phenomenal.17 Insofar as we have framed content as manifest content, then that is something 
available to the subject – as something that is within their ken which (at least partly) captures 
how things are experientially with them. However, if intentional modes are to contribute to 
phenomenally individuating intentional experience, then the relevant modes would have to 
be phenomenologically manifest. Put otherwise, if the relevant intentional mode was not in 
																																																						
2003: 7-11; cf. Searle 1983: Ch.1). This turns on issues concerning what to say about non-existent 
objects so need not concern us here.  
16 Crane commits to this (see his 2000: 8; 2001: 144) as does Chalmers (2004: 176-8). Note importantly 
the notion of something being phenomenologically manifest is broad enough to allow that it might be 
part of the background of the experience, or figure in a non-prominent way. I thank a referee at 
Erkenntnis for pressing me on this point.  
17 One can individuate intentional states in non-phenomenal and non-intentional ways. For example, 
in terms of their causal-functional role, or the neurophysiological state on which they are based. 
Alternatively, one might individuate them in terms of externalist representational content, which need 
not be phenomenally salient to the subject undergoing the experience.  
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some sense given within the first-person perspective to phenomenal consciousness, then it 
couldn’t be part of the phenomenal grounds for individuating the relevant intentional 
experience.18 
Given this clarification, we should distinguish between phenomenal and non-phenomenal 
Mode Intentionalism. The former is the view that the intentional mode of the experience is 
phenomenologically manifest, so contributing to the phenomenal character of the experience 
and supporting phenomenal intentional individuation. The latter view might claim that 
intentional modes are theoretical categories. We introduce them in theory of intentionality to 
play a classifying role, but they are not the kind of thing that is phenomenologically manifest 
to the subject undergoing the experience.19 Simply put: Intentional modes qua intentional 
modes are not part of the first-person phenomenal character of intentional experience. But if 
that is the case, then intentional mode qua intentional mode cannot be something which partly 
determines the phenomenal character of intentional experience (or supports phenomenal 
intentional individuation). After all, non-experiential reflective categorizations of experience 
types are not the kind of thing that determines the phenomenal character of intentional 
experience. Instead they are the type of thing that is supposed to (conceptually) reflect 
phenomenal character. So, non-phenomenal Mode Intentionalism is just a version of Strong 
Intentionalism when it comes to answering the question of what it is about experience that 
determines what-it-is-like. Given this, let’s continue to talk of Mode Intentionalism, keeping in 
mind that we are talking about phenomenal Mode-Intentionalism. 
Let me now explain how Mode Intentionalism should not attempt to make intentional 
modes phenomenologically manifest by placing them into the manifest content. This kind of 
view would have it that the structure of intentional experience is as follows: there is the 
‘primary’ intentional object, under the relevant aspect, and a ‘secondary’ intentional object, 
the mode of the experience, which would itself be presented under a certain aspect. Take my 
visual experience of a vista. There is the primary intentional object, the vista, which is 
																																																						
18 I return to intentional individuation in section 4. 
19 Arguably this is closer to Searle’s (1983: 4-6, 12) view. 
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presented under the relevant aspects, say as having certain colours and spatial properties. Yet, 
in addition, there is the secondary intentional object, the mode of experience, presented under 
the aspect of being visual. Therefore, the content would involve both. It might be suggested 
that such a view would hardly be Mode Intentionalism since intentional modes become part 
of the manifest content. That is a fair complaint, but explaining why this strategy is 
problematic is instructive.   
There is the threat of an infinite regress: if the intentional mode is phenomenologically 
manifest in virtue of the experience also being secondarily directed toward it, then we might 
ask what the intentional mode of this second form of directedness is and whether it is 
phenomenologically manifest in virtue of being taken as an object. Note that the view cannot 
respond that there need be no intentional mode under which the intentional mode (second 
order) is experienced, since then we would need a principled reason for why intentional modes 
are not required for second-order representations whereas they are for first-order 
representations. Perhaps the more cogent response could be that intentional experience 
necessarily includes higher-order thoughts which take intentional modes as secondary 
intentional objects and that the intentional mode of thought need not be phenomenologically 
manifest (i.e. is unconscious). However, even if the regress can be stopped in this way, we are 
led to the following further problem.  
There is an important distinction between the fact that one’s experience is a visual 
experience, and the intentional mode being phenomenologically manifest in anything like the 
way the ‘primary’ intentional object is. In this context, we might appeal to the distinction 
between phenomenal or sensible awareness of objects and their properties, and fact-
awareness that such and such is the case.20 An example of the former is my visual awareness 
of the vista and its properties, of the latter that my experience is a certain type.  
Whatever intentional modes as purpotedly phenomenologically manifest components of 
experience are, they are not the plausibly kind of thing which figure in experience by way of 
																																																						
20 See Dretske 1999: 39-65 and Shoemaker 1996: 5, 205. 
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phenomenal or sensible object-awareness. For example, in having a visual experience I don’t 
– in addition to seeing the vista and its properties – simultaneously seem to see or otherwise 
sense (at least on any standard understanding of those terms) the intentional mode of the 
experience (and its properties). To flesh out this phenomenological claim, consider that the 
mode of my experience, say its’ being a visual experience, doesn’t seem to be located anywhere 
in my field of vision. Further to this, it doesn’t seem to figure as something I can visually 
attend to in the way I can visually attend to the vista and its properties, and it certainly doesn’t 
look a certain way.  
Supporting these phenomenological claims, intentional modes don’t seem to meet one of 
Sydney Shoemaker’s important criteria for object-perception, namely a kind of 
(re)identification condition. As he puts it, ‘when one perceives one is able to pick out one 
object from others, distinguishing it from the others by information, provided by the 
perception, about both its relational and its nonrelational properties. The provision of such 
information is involved in the “tracking” of the object over time, and its reidentification from 
one time to another’.21 Yet, intentional modes (as putatively manifest in experience) don’t 
seem to be the kind of thing one identifies by distinguishing their (relational and nonrelational) 
properties. And the idea that sense-perpetual experience provides one with information about 
intentional modes as a means to re-identify such modes on different instances by virtue of 
involving a kind of object-perception of them looks odd. Such considerations sufficiently 
support the claim that however intentional modes figure in experience they are not perceived or 
sensed, or at least not in a way that can be modelled after the object-perception involved in 
sense-perceptual experience.  
On the other hand, if the way intentional modes are phenomenologically manifest in 
intentional experience is on the basis of a co-present accompanying fact-awareness that one’s 
experience is of a certain type, then all intentional experiences would involve higher-order 
																																																						
21 See Shoemaker 1996: 205. Shoemaker presents these considerations in the context of a detailed 
argument concerning introspection, specifically arguing for the conclusion that it is doubtful we have 
a special sense for detecting our own experiences. 
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thoughts with conceptual content. This is because such fact-awareness that one’s experience 
is in the relevant mode would require higher-order thoughts with the conceptual content that 
<my experience is a mode (e.g. visual) experience>. The subject whose experience involved 
such fact-awareness would have to meet the possession conditions for such concepts as 
EXPERIENCE and VISUAL. This is cognitively over-demanding: Intentional experience 
would necessarily involve higher-order cognitive-conceptual states concerning intentional 
modes.22  
Summing up, for Mode Intentionalism to be a distinctive proposal about what determines 
the phenomenal character of intentional experience the following must be the case. First, the 
relevant intentional mode must be phenomenologically manifest to the subject qua intentional 
mode, rather than as a non-phenomenal theoretical category. Second, and relatedly, it 
shouldn’t be the case that such phenomenological manifestation is achieved by placing 
intentional modes into the manifest content on the model of either phenomenal or sensible 
object-awareness, or fact-awareness. 
Before going onto consider the phenomenal contrast argument for Mode Intentionalism 
let me again note the availability of the view I called Intentionalism about Modes since it is arguably 
a view which makes intentional modes phenomenologically manifest by building the mode 
into the content (as a special kind of ‘mode-infused’ content). The mode would figure in a 
separate content-based aspect of the experience – yet presumably, given the considerations 
above, not on the model of either object-awareness or fact-awareness. We will have occasion 
to consider this variation in detail in section 5. The argument that follows focuses on Mode 
Intentionalism as clarified in this section.  
 
 
 
 
																																																						
22 Cf. Higher-Order-Thought theories of consciousness which come close to the first part of this claim 
(see Rosenthal 1986: 329-59).  
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2. The Phenomenal Contrast Argument 
2.1 The form of argument  
Here is the central argument one finds for Mode Intentionalism.23  
 
Arg.1 The Phenomenal Contrast Argument 
P1. It is possible to have pairs of intentional experiences which share the same manifest 
content but differ in phenomenal character. 
P2. The best explanation of such a phenomenal difference is that there is a difference in 
the relevant intentional mode. 
C. Mode Intentionalism is true: there are phenomenal differences that aren’t manifest 
content differences but are differences in intentional mode.  
 
Let me first say something about the form of the argument. We have an argument from the 
best explanation, and so it is abductive rather than deductive. To ultimately make good on 
the claim that Mode Intentionalism is the best explanation of the truth of P1 (if P1 is true – 
see below) we would have to consider alternative explanations (i.e. alternative Intentionalist 
views). Importantly if P1 is true, then Strong Intentionalism is false, and so would not be an 
alternative explanation for P1 being true. The central alternative is Weak Intentionalism 
(although the abductive form leaves this open). As promised, I won’t comment on the 
plausibility of Weak Intentionalism. However, to ultimately make good on this argument 
Weak Intentionalism would need to be shown either (i) false on independent grounds, and so 
not a possible alternative explanation, or (ii) in some way a less good explanation than appeal 
to intentional modes making the relevant phenomenal difference. With this clarified, I bracket 
this issue.24  
																																																						
23 See Crane 2000: 8; 2001: 86, 2009a: 474-491; Horgan and Tienson 2002; 520–33. The argument is a 
reconstruction of claims made by these authors. Block (1996: 38) also uses cross-modal cases to argue 
against Strong Intentionalism (see fn. 26).  
24 Intentionalism about Modes would be another option; see section 5. 
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A further issue with the argument is that P1 begs the question against Strong 
Intentionalism. Insofar as Strong Intentionalism claims that all phenomenal differences are 
differences in manifest content, then P1 denies this. However, this is fine if P1 can be shown 
to be true by reference to phenomenal contrast cases, and so Strong Intentionalism false, but 
this needs demonstrating, not assuming. In what follows, I consider cases that purport to 
show that P1 is true (so from which P2 follows given what we are assuming above). 
As a final comment on the argument let me emphasize why (a) it is helpful to formulate 
phenomenal contrast cases in arguing for Mode Intentionalism, and (b) the view needs to find 
cases in which it is prima facie plausible that the manifest content is the same across pairs of 
experiences (as supporting P1). Concerning (a), note that if one were just to consider a single 
intentional experience, not engaging in any comparison, it would be challenging to determine 
what aspects of phenomenal character to attribute to manifest content compared with what 
to (putatively) attribute to intentional mode. Intuitions clash about whether intentional modes 
are required to explain phenomenal character in any given case: Mode Intentionalism insists 
they are, Strong Intentionalism denies this. By considering phenomenal contrast cases we 
have something against which to test these views, since there is a data point (i.e. the 
phenomenal contrast) which requires an explanation, and we can assess the plausibility of 
different explanations.  
Concerning (b), remember that Mode Intentionalism, as a form of Intentionalism, accepts 
that differences in manifest content make differences to phenomenal character. So, there will 
be all manner of phenomenal contrasts between different experiences that Mode 
Intentionalism will agree depend (in part) on differences in manifest content. The Mode 
Intentionalist will add that, nonetheless, the relevant intentional mode also contributes to 
phenomenal character. However, where manifest content is also a variable it will be difficult 
to assess whether phenomenal contrasts across pairs of experiences support an appeal to a 
phenomenologically salient intentional mode or can just be captured in terms of those 
differences in manifest content. So, the Mode Intentionalist needs to find special cases of 
phenomenal contrast. Namely, those in which it is prima facie plausible that the manifest 
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content is the same across pairs of experiences. It is then up to the Strong Intentionalist to 
defeat any such prima facie plausibility. 
Now that we have understood why Arg.1 takes the form it does we can consider cases 
which purport to show that P1 is true.  
 
2.2 Three Examples 
Here are three examples of phenomenal contrast cases for sense-perceptual experience. 
 
Example 1. Visual and Tactile 
In the 1970s a water-based covering called Artex was used to decorate ceilings, using 
swirling effects to produce a textured finish. As it happens, I’m in a room with an Artex 
ceiling. Looking up at a portion of the ceiling, I enjoy a visual experience which presents 
it as looking rough, and so which has the manifest content <ceiling as rough> (granting 
that roughness is a property that can be presented in visual experience). Intrigued by the 
rough look of the ceiling, I investigate further, reaching up to touch it. This time I enjoy 
a tactile (or haptic) experience which presents the same portion of the ceiling as feeling 
rough, and so which also has the manifest content <ceiling as rough>.  
 
Example 2. Visual and Interoceptive 
A patient is rushed to hospital with suspected spinal cord compression of the kind which 
leads to numbness in the lower half of the body. Laid out on the hospital bed, the doctor 
checks for sensitivity in the patient’s legs by pricking a needle into their foot. The patient 
visually observes the doctor’s action, and so has a visual experience with the manifest 
content <foot as pin-pricked>. However, they feel no sensation. The patient is rushed 
to surgery to remove a herniated disc which is compressing the sciatic nerve. Sometime 
after the surgery, the doctor returns to check the sensitivity in the lower half of the 
patient’s body, carrying out the same observation by pricking a needle into the same spot 
on the patient’s foot. The surgery was a success, and the patient now feels the pin-prick, 
and so enjoys an interoceptive experience with a manifest content <foot as pin-pricked>.  
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Example 3. Taste and Smell 
Sitting in a restaurant perusing the menu, I opt for the seabass. Unbeknownst to me at 
the time of ordering, the seabass fillets are past their sell-by-date. The waiter brings the 
dish to the table, and I can smell that the fish is rotten; I have an olfactory experience 
with the manifest content <fish as rotten>. However, I want to make sure, so I take a 
small bite. Unfortunately, my suspicions are confirmed since it also tastes rotten. And so, 
I have a gustatory experience with the manifest content <fish as rotten>.    
 
In all three examples, we have a pair of experiences in which it is prima facie plausible that the 
manifest content is the same. But there is a phenomenal contrast – substantiating P1 in 
Arg.1.25 There is a phenomenological difference between what-it-is-like to see the ceiling as 
rough from what-it-is-like to feel the ceiling as rough; likewise, between what-it-is-like to see 
one’s foot being pin-pricked, from what-it-is-like to (interoceptively) feel one’s foot being pin-
pricked; and finally, between what-it-is-like to smell the fish as rotten, from what-it-is-like to taste 
the fish as rotten.   
Given that we accept this, we need an explanation of the phenomenal contrast. Absent a 
possible appeal to manifest content – which is the same across the pairs of experiences – the 
best explanation of what makes the phenomenological difference between them is that they 
are in different phenomenologically manifest intentional modes. In Example 1, the first is in 
the visual mode, whereas the second is in the tactile mode. In Example 2, the first is in the visual 
mode, whereas the second is in the interoceptive mode. In Example 3, the first is in the mode 
of smell, whereas the second is in the mode of taste. And crucially this makes a 
phenomenological difference that outruns the manifest content of those experiences. 
																																																						
25 It should be noted that in Example 3, the experiences involve high-level content, and this could also 
be said of Example 2 (see Siegel 2010 for discussion of high-level content; see also fn.29).  
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Phenomenal character, therefore, outruns manifest content as claimed by Mode 
Intentionalism.26  
However, any prima facie plausibility to the sameness of content claims in these cases is 
arguably easily defeated by the following line of thought. Michael Tye considers an example 
in which one is to imagine the difference between seeing a round shape and feeling the same 
shape by running one’s fingers over it: ‘Suppose [somewhat analogously to Example 1 above] 
that in both cases, one has an experience as of a round shape. Still, the one is a haptic 
experience and the other a visual experience. Phenomenologically, there is a significant 
difference between the two…’27 So, if the content of these experiences is nothing more than <o 
is round>, then the phenomenal contrast argument for Mode Intentionalism goes through.  
However, the Strong Intentionalist can reply that there is simply more to the content of 
both experiences, with respect to which they are different: ‘in seeing the shape one has an 
experience as of colour. But, colour is not represented in the content of the haptic experience. 
Conversely, temperature is represented in the haptic experience but not in the visual one (or 
at least not to the same extent)’.28 The thought is that the overall contents of the experiences 
outstrip the mere representation of the shape as round, and it is these other differences in 
content that can be recruited to explain the phenomenological differences pace Mode 
Intentionalism. 
Let me say several things about this response. First, it is possible to imagine creatures 
whose visual experiences don’t invariably include experiences of the colours of the shapes 
they perceive. In fact, those with total colour-blindness (say of the cone monochromacy type), 
only see things in greyscale. Likewise, it is possible to imagine creatures who enjoy forms of 
																																																						
26 Block (1996: 38) gives an example of a non-content based phenomenal contrast between a visual and 
auditory experience of an aeroplane having the same perceived location; both having the content ‘as of 
that location’. This is not compelling for reasons given by Tye (2000: 94-5), and because the way visual 
experience locates its object in space is more precise than the way auditory experience does. Given this, 
it is not clear that the demonstrative fixes on the exact same location, which would be required for 
prima facie sameness of content. 
27 Tye 2000: 94-5. 
28 Ibid: 95.  
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haptic perception in which temperature is not represented. In considering such cases, we 
wouldn’t – as Tye claims – be engaging in a suspect process of mental abstraction from actual 
experiences. Rather we would be imagining possible experiences that in critical respects have 
less content than paradigmatic cases. If that is the case, then the Mode Intentionalist can place 
certain kinds of (idealised) restrictions on the examples in order to insulate them from this 
kind of response.  
Secondly, consider the following point. Those intuitive phenomenal differences between 
the contrasting experiences don’t seem to turn on additional properties being represented that 
were simply not mentioned or overlooked in the original descriptions. Put otherwise, the 
phenomenal differences that seem pre-theoretically obvious connect to those experiences qua 
their being visual experiences of texture vs haptic experiences of texture (Example 1). This is 
not to deny that if the visual experience also represents a colour property this will make a 
phenomenal difference. The critical question is whether it makes the relevant phenomenal difference 
which seems intuitive in the original description. As such, arguably the phenomenal difference 
between what-it-is-like to see the ceiling as rough from what-it-is-like to feel the ceiling as rough, 
requires an explanation which turns on something to do with differences connected to visual 
experiences of roughness vs haptic experiences of roughness. The fact that such experiences may 
represent other properties as well (e.g. the visual experience representing colour, and the 
haptic experience representing temperature) doesn’t hone in on this desideratum.  
So, in what follows I show why the argument fails in a way which grants that there is a 
prima facie plausibility to sameness of content claims in such cases qua the ‘central’ properties 
putatively represented (as the properties focused on in the original examples, such as roughness, 
pinpricked, rotten). 
 
3. The Strong Intentionalist critique 
In the previous section we saw that Mode Intentionalism appeals to examples which provide 
reason to think that P1 in Arg.1 is true. I now consider responses open to the defender of 
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Strong Intentionalism, who resists any appeal to phenomenologically salient intentional 
modes determining (even if only in part) the phenomenal character of experience. 
Here is the chief strategy the Strong Intentionalist should adopt. In Examples 1, 2, and 
3, the properties experientially represented are, on closer examination, phenomenally 
different. As apparent properties of the ceiling, roughness-felt is not experientially exactly the 
same property as roughness-seen. Likewise, as apparent properties of my foot, pinprick-felt is not 
experientially exactly the same property as pinprick-seen. And finally, as an apparent property 
of the fish, rottenness-smelt is not experientially exactly the same property as rottenness-tasted. Let 
me parse this in more philosophical terms.29     
It may be the case that the relevant object and its properties (e.g. the ceiling and its 
roughness) refer to the same real object, as a concrete physical particular, and properties that 
it in fact has. In veridical cases this object (and its properties) would stand in a causal relation 
to experience, so determining the same wide (externalist) representational content. So, perhaps 
the pairs of experiences have exactly the same content in that sense of content (i.e. same property-
referents).  
Remember though, Strong Intentionalism need not be committed to this. Instead, what 
is arguably crucial for determining whether the manifest content is exactly the same across 
pairs of experiences is whether those experiences have what we can call the same property-
senses. At the most general level, property-senses can be characterized as the way the relevant 
property seems to the subject. So, the property-sense of the colour red, for example, would be 
intentionally individuated in terms of the property that looks the way red looks. As such, we 
are appealing to a notion of sense-individuated properties. These are properties intentionally 
																																																						
29 A different strategy would be to insist that roughness, for example, isn’t ever visually represented, 
and in fact is only a proper sensible of touch, and therefore not a common sensible which it is possible to be 
presented with across sense-modalities (see Dretske 2000: 458; cf. Crane 2001: 86). While this might 
be a plausible route for the Strong Intentionalist to take in some cases, in essence denying there are any 
common sensibles, the strategy would have to be amended for Examples 2 and 3. One option in those 
cases would be to deny that sense-perceptual experiences have the relevant kind of high-level content 
(e.g. rottenness is not a proper sensible at all). However, such a move strikes me as unpersuasive for cases 
like Example 4 (see section 4).  
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individuated at the level of how the relevant property of the intentional object seems to the 
subject. As such, we a considering how that intentional object is given under a specific mode 
of presentation.   
However, the above formulation of property-senses is not as precise as one would like. 
What is evident from the above is that property-senses are properties that are in some way tied 
to the way things appear. However, it might be asked, which properties? There are many 
candidates. For example, for an arbitrary property F, F’s property-senses could be: 
(i) the properties that correspond to, but are not identical with, the properties that F things     
appear to have. 
(ii) the properties that F things appear to have. 
(iii) the properties that F things appear to have to certain subjects. 
(iv) the properties that F things appear to have to certain subjects under standard conditions. 
(v) a proper subset of the properties that F things appear to have to certain subjects under 
standard conditions. 
In this sense, merely saying that F’s property-senses are individuated by how F seems to a 
subject doesn’t decide between these characterizations. Going forward, let’s operate with (iv); 
property-senses are the properties that F things appear to have to certain subjects under standard conditions. 
So, the property-sense of the colour red, for example, would be the property that red things 
appear to have to certain subject under standard conditions (e.g. standard lighting conditions). 
Returning to the central dialectic, let me illustrate the importance of this distinction 
between property-referents and property-senses. A familiar claim of Intentionalist views is that it is 
possible to undergo hallucinatory experiences that are phenomenally indistinguishable from 
their veridical counterparts.30 For example, it is claimed that it is possible to enjoy a 
hallucinatory visual experience as of a red and rectangular table that would be phenomenally 
indistinguishable (‘from the inside’) from a veridical experience – a factive seeing of a red and 
rectangular table.  
																																																						
30 Naïve realist views deny a version of this claim (e.g. Brewer 2011). 
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Do the experiences have the same content? It depends on our notion of content. The 
two experiences differ in their wide (externalist) representational content, insofar as this is 
understood as what is determined by causal relations to the environment. The veridical 
experience is relational in this sense, whereas the hallucinatory experience ex hypothesi isn’t. 
Although the subject (putatively) couldn’t tell, just on the basis of the experience, whether 
they were in the ‘good case’ or the ‘bad case’. However, what is the same, at least according 
to the Intentionalist views we have been considering, is the manifest content as specified in 
terms of the sense-individuated properties. Both involve the same property-senses, such that the 
subject is being appeared to in the same specific way: in both the veridical and hallucinatory 
perception the red and rectangular table appears to have the properties that red and 
rectangular tables appear to have to the relevant subjects under standard conditions. 
The flip side of this is that two experiences may ‘represent’ the same reference-individuated 
properties – the relevant properties being, in fact, the same – but leave it open whether those 
experiences ‘present’ the same sense-individuated properties to the subject. Indeed, in our ceiling 
case, this is true. The physical-chemical composition of the Artex, which in veridical cases 
causes both its visual and tactile appearance, is the same. Likewise, in our rotten fish case: the 
physical-chemical composition of the fish, which in veridical cases causes both its smell and 
taste is the same (typically it is the presence of a specific organic compound called 
trimethylamine). However, it doesn’t follow from this that the sense-individuated properties 
across the cases are the same. 
Given this analysis, the Strong Intentionalist has a way of respecting the phenomenal 
contrast between the pairs of experiences in our examples. Simply put: The Strong 
Intentionalist can appeal to the sense-reference distinction, with phenomenal character 
determined by content understood (at least in part) at the level of sense, and more specifically 
in terms of property-senses. On this basis, they can say that the phenomenally contrasting 
cases experientially present different sense-individuated properties of the same intentional 
objects, and so have different overall manifest contents (regardless of whether they share the 
same wide content). Or in different terminology, the pairs of experiences have different 
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(overall) sensible profiles. And it is accepted that difference in sense (so understood) guarantees 
a difference in phenomenology for experiential states.31  
We can now present an argument which formalises the above analysis, and undermines 
Mode Intentionalism.  
 
Arg.2 Against Mode Intentionalism 
P1. Two intentional experiences which share the exact same manifest content would 
share the same property-sense.  
P2. Difference in property-senses across experiences guarantees a difference in 
phenomenal character. 
P3. Insofar as we have a pair of experiences which are directed toward the same 
intentional object in which there is a phenomenal contrast, then it is legitimate to ask 
whether the property-senses are the same. 
P4. In the relevant phenomenal contrast cases offered by Mode Intentionalism the 
property-senses are in fact different, and so a difference in property-sense (and so 
manifest content) is available as an explanation of the phenomenal contrast.  
																																																						
31 See Johnston 2004: 134-5; Chalmers 2004: 171-7 (cf. Speaks 2009: 545-553; Shoemaker 1996: 104). 
A similar strategy is deployed by Tye 1995: 155-159; 2014: 47-48 and Bain 2003: 517-8. Chalmers (2006) 
tries to capture a similar notion of property-senses with his notion of Edenic properties. Let me, 
however, note a worry concerning this strategy for the Strong Intentionalist. It might be said we need 
a more robust way of individuating property-senses than merely by appeal to the properties that F things 
appear to have to certain subjects under standard conditions. After all, this might be read as claiming that we 
are individuating property-senses (at least partly) on the basis of phenomenal character, and so helping 
ourselves to the very thing the Strong Intentionalist hopes to explain: how to individuate content in 
such a way that it entails individuation in phenomenal character. Put otherwise, if we are using 
phenomenal character – how the relevant property phenomenally seems – to decide when distinct 
properties are represented, then arguably we can’t then turn around and say that the representations 
explain the phenomenal character. For this paper, I don’t wish to provide a defence of Strong 
Intentionalist on this issue, but rather show how a central strategy in arguing for Mode Intentionalist 
is suspect. However, note that the Strong Intentionalist might reply that we should further individuate 
property-senses by their internal causal/functional roles (see Chalmers 2004: 171-7). More needs to be 
said on this issue (although see the point in the text below concerning the connection between 
differences in sensible profile and connection to belief contexts).  
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(C) Mode Intentionalism is not well-motivated by the relevant phenomenal contrast 
cases. 
 
Applying this argument to our pairs of experiences, consider Example 1. There is undoubtedly 
a phenomenal contrast between the two experiences. But it is questionable whether the 
manifest content is exactly the same qua property-sense. While we may misleadingly use the 
same word for the properties in play – namely ‘roughness’ – the sensible profiles are arguably 
different. Likewise, for Example 3. Anyone who has ever smelt rotten fish knows that it smells 
significantly worse than it tastes, and the taste of rottenness is different from the smell of 
rottenness. For example, rotten meat usually has a sweet aspect, which isn’t part of the smell 
of rotten meat. More could be said about the relevant property contrasts here. But it seems 
reasonable to suppose that (as in Example 1) while we may misleadingly use the same word 
for the properties in play – namely ‘rottenness’ – the sensible profiles are manifestly different 
(ditto for Example 2).32 Yet, if the sensible profiles are different, then we don’t need to appeal 
to differences in phenomenologically manifest intentional modes to explain the phenomenal 
contrasts, we can just appeal to differences in manifest content – or so the Strong 
Intentionalist says.  
To further support P4 (in Arg.2), consider the following points concerning Example 1. 
One familiar feature of intensional contexts for linguistic expressions, in which the same 
referents are presented under different senses, is the failure of substitution of co-referring terms 
for the relevant inferences. Mapping analogous considerations onto experiences, it is relatively 
non-controversial that if two experiences have different manifest contents, such that their 
sensible profiles differ, then this should be reflected in a difference in which beliefs it is rationally 
																																																						
32 See Bain 2003: 17-20 on the distinct sensible profiles involved in visual and interoceptive experience, 
like Example 2. Bain makes the claim (following Martin 1998b: 269-70; 1993; 209-10), that the 
difference in content in such cases is partly to be explained in terms of the object of the interoceptive 
experience (in contrast to the visual case) presenting as oneself, and so as including what Martin calls a 
sense of bodily ownership. 
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acceptable for subjects to form (and hold) on their basis.33 From this we can generate the 
following constraint: If a pair of experiences, directed toward the same object, differ in their 
sensible profiles – and so manifest content – then it is rationally acceptable to believe that 
one and the same object is the way it is presented in one experience and at the same time not 
believe (or withhold assent to believing) that the object is the way it is presented in an 
alternative experience they haven’t had. 
With this constraint in mind, consider a modification to Example 1. Say I have the visual 
experience of the ceiling as looking rough, but I don’t touch it. It is rationally acceptable for me 
to assent to the belief that the ceiling looks rough while withholding assent to whether the ceiling 
feels rough. Of course, I may guess; ‘things that look rough usually feel rough’. But this is 
irrelevant; if the property-senses (and so manifest content) were exactly the same, there would 
be no need for such a guess. In one way of putting it, I would be (seemingly) acquainted with 
roughness per se, as a common sensible. If the sensible profiles were exactly the same – as Mode 
Intentionalism needs them to be to substantiate P1 in Arg.1 – then, other things being equal, 
there would be no disanalogy in terms of the beliefs it would be rationally acceptable to hold. 
But there is. And it is the difference in sensible profiles which would explain why it is rationally 
acceptable for me to take myself to be in a good epistemic position to judge that the ceiling 
looks rough without ipso facto committing to its feeling rough. There is no rational failing here 
because I just don’t have (seeming) acquaintance with the intentional object under this 
different sensible profile, as having that property-sense. 
Summing up, it remains open for the critic of Mode Intentionalism to argue as follows 
concerning the examples in 2.2. The different pairs of experiences present the same 
intentional objects as having different property-senses – as having different overall sensible 
profiles. As such, they don’t have exactly the same manifest content. If that is correct, then 
																																																						
33 See Evans 1982; Peacocke 1992. 
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we have not been given cases which conclusively show that P1 in Arg.1 is true and so the 
argument doesn’t go through.34   
 
4. Unsuccessful Mode Intentionalist responses 
The Mode Intentionalist might respond to the argument of the previous section as follows. 
They could claim that the Strong Intentionalist makes use of intentional modes in talk of seen-
roughness and felt-roughness (or smelt-rottenness and tasted-rottenness). To further see this, 
consider that if roughness can only be experienced with property-sense A via vision and property-
sense B via touch, and property-senses determine phenomenal character, then this version of 
Strong Intentionalism is arguably just a notational variant of the claim that the visual and 
tactile modes partly determine phenomenal character. So, despite the hyphens, the italicised 
terms refer to intentional modes, and given that, they are contributing to phenomenal 
character in a phenomenologically manifest way.  
If this is the case, it might be questioned what the rationale is for thinking of these 
different property senses as differences in content rather than mode, given that our 
																																																						
34 Let me address a worry about the notion of content as involving property-senses developed in this 
section. One might argue that the notion invoked is merely a subjective difference in the mode of access 
to the object, in that it does not even purport to represent objectively different entities in the world. 
But if that is the case, it might be asked why such differences in property senses that are ‘merely 
subjective’ are not merely phenomenal? Put otherwise, is there a substantive difference between this kind 
of view (which one might call ‘aspectual-shape intentionalism’) and a view which would count such 
differences as ‘purely phenomenal’? First, let me remind the reader that the notion of property sense is 
as follows: Property-senses are the properties that F things appear to have to certain subjects under standard 
conditions. In that sense with respect to the experiences themselves, such property-senses do purport to 
be properties of objective entities in the world (as the sensible profiles of apparent objects). Such 
differences in property-senses therefore certainly will not seem ‘purely phenomenal’ insofar as they 
appear to the subject as differences in the way the object of the experience seems. Whether such 
property-senses should be metaphysically counted as no more than ‘purely phenomenal’ differences, in 
the sense of lacking genuine reference (i.e. picking out a metaphysically real property), taps in issues 
which I am not considering for the purposes of this paper (see introduction). Nonetheless, there is an 
important difference between Strong Intentionalism qua content involving property-senses, and a view 
where such property-senses are ‘purely phenomenal’ in the sense of not even seeming to be appearance 
properties of objects. I thank a referee at Erkenntnis for pushing me to clarify this issue. 
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expressions for them are associated with the relevant modes. And further to this, why it still 
important that we are to count such differences in property-sense as differences in content 
rather than mode?35 
Let me explain why this line of response is unconvincing and answer these questions. 
First, the Strong Intentionalist can emphasize that given the fine-grained character of that 
content it is difficult to capture the relevant sensible profiles – as marking the difference in 
manifest contents – in words. Our linguistic competence for expressing the 
phenomenological difference in property-senses between roughness-felt and roughness-seen 
is limited. Perhaps talk of ‘seen-roughness’ and ‘felt-roughness’ is as good as it gets without 
engaging in more detailed comparative descriptions (e.g. seen-roughness is a property-sense 
which is like this, whereas felt-roughness is a property-sense which is like this etc.). As such, 
these phrases are shorthand for roughness as a property-sense when I see it, and roughness as 
a property-sense when I feel it (ditto for felt-pinprick vs seen-pinprick in Example 2 and smelt-
rottenness vs tasted-rottenness in Example 3).  
Once explicated in this way it should be clear that the Strong Intentionalist incurs no 
commitment, at least in virtue of the use of such abbreviations, to intentional modes as 
phenomenologically salient component of experiences, as something different and separate from 
the relevant intentional content, so understood. Put otherwise, there is nothing in the notion 
of property-senses as explicated in the previous section that commits one to the claim that 
phenomenal character outruns manifest content (we will have occasion to consider a view, 
Intentionalism about Modes, in which the mode ‘infuses’ the content in section 5).  
Second, the Strong Intentionalist can emphasize that when it comes to the theory of 
intentionality talk of different intentional modes is fine. We intelligibly theorize about 
categorical differences between the modes of vision, touch, audition, gustation, olfaction, 
interoception, etc. But their claim is that when it comes to what determines phenomenal 
character, differences across pairs of experiences in phenomenal contrast cases are always 
																																																						
35 I thank a referee at Erkenntnis for pressing me to sharpen this response.   
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differences in manifest content by way of property-senses. In this sense, it remains open for 
the Strong Intentionalist to claim that paradigmatic sense-perceptual experiences are mode 
transparent: intentional mode qua intentional mode is not a manifest part of the phenomenal 
character of those experiences – it is not a part of how things are experientially for one in the 
way required by Mode Intentionalism (and the phenomenal contrast cases considered do not 
show otherwise). In that sense it remains important for the Strong Intentionalist that we count 
such differences in property-senses as differences in content rather than in mode so as to 
accurately reflect the claimed phenomenology of mode-transparency in paradigmatic sense-
perceptual experience.  
Given these points it should be clear that the Strong Intentionalist position that, for 
example, roughness can only be experienced with property-sense A via vision and property-sense B 
via touch, and that phenomenal character is determined by these property-senses, does not 
become a notational variant of Mode Intentionalism. It does not insofar as the relevant 
intentional modes are still not phenomenologically salient qua intentional modes on this 
version of Strong Intentionalism, and the truth of that latter claim is essential to Mode 
Intentionalism.  
However, the Mode Intentionalist can take a different tact by asking what grounds, for 
example, the reflective judgement that my experience is a visual experience. They might then 
press the following point: if it were not the case that before reflection the intentional mode is 
a phenomenologically manifest aspect of my experience, then I would have no grounds for 
making the typically correct reflective judgement that my experience is in the relevant mode. 
Given we make such correct judgements, the best explanation is that intentional modes are 
phenomenologically manifest aspects of intentional experience which partly determine its 
phenomenal character.  
The Strong Intentionalist can respond as follows. Arguably this ability can be sufficiently 
grounded on the kinds of properties (as property-senses) involved in the experience – that is, 
without appeal to phenomenologically manifest intentional modes. Consider the visual case. 
My ability to correctly judge that my experience is a visual experience can arguably be 
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sufficiently grounded in the fact that my experience presents properties that are categorially 
visual or otherwise observable properties, as having the relevant visual sensible profiles or 
property-senses. I can know my experience is a visual one and can make that judgement, 
because the properties it presents are the proper sensibles of vision. Note, given this response, 
the Strong Intentionalist is committed (as one would expect) to those property-senses of 
‘seen-roughness’ and ‘felt-roughness’ being proper sensibles of vision and touch respectively.   
Tying back to issues of intentional individuation the Strong Intentionalist would say the 
following: To be able to reflectively pick out my experience as a visual experience, and in 
reflection differentiate it (qua mode) from others, requires no more than a recognition that 
the kind of properties it presents are visual (and only visual) properties. As such, the phenomenal 
grounds of this ability can be sufficiently captured in terms of the kinds of properties (visual, 
tactile, auditory, etc.) which figure in the manifest content. These properties characterise what-
it-is-like to be appeared to (for the relevant subjects under standard conditions) in the relevantly 
distinctive ways. So there is no simple route to Mode Intentionalism through considering our 
ability to reflectively categorize intentional states into different intentional modes.	 
As a final move the Mode Intentionalist might try a different example: 
 
Example 4. Vision and Imagistic Memory 
One summer I decide to take a trip to Paris. During my stay, I visit the Eiffel Tower. 
Standing far enough away to be able to see the whole tower I look up at it, taking in its 
off-brown, slightly gold-tinged metallic colour. I have a visual experience of the Eiffel 
Tower looking a certain way, and therefore my experience has the manifest content <Eiffel 
Tower as that colour>. At a later date, having returned home, I remember my trip. I 
recollect how the Eiffel Tower looked by visualizing, in imagistic memory, the tower as 
looking the same certain way it looked when I was there. In doing so, my imagistic 
experience has the manifest content <Eiffel Tower as that colour>. 
 
On the basis of this example, the Mode Intentionalist might argue that we have a pair of 
experiences in which the manifest content is the same in terms of the relevant property-sense; 
 30 
namely, the property-sense of the determinate shade ‘off-brown, slightly gold-tinged metallic’, 
or less demandingly just ‘that colour’. Nonetheless, there is a phenomenal contrast: what-it-is-
like to visually see the Eiffel Tower as looking that colour is different from what-it-is-like, in 
imagistic memory, to recollect its looking that same way. Given the sensible profiles are the 
same, but there is a phenomenal contrast, the best explanation of that contrast is that the 
experiences are in phenomenologically manifest different intentional modes (the first being 
visual, the second imagistic memory). If that is correct, we have a case which shows that P1 (in 
Arg.1) is true and so Arg.1 is up and running again. 
This example seems more compelling than Example 1, 2 or 3, qua identical sensible 
profiles, although imagistic memory is not a sense-perceptual experience, so we are setting up 
a phenomenal contrast outside the class of sense-perceptual experiences (although within the 
class of non-doxastic intentional experiences). However, even bracketing this, it might be said 
that the manifest content in the visual case would have to reflect the full visual scene, whereas 
in imagistic memory this would not be (or more strongly could not be) the case. Yet, for the 
sake of argument, we can grant that either (i) the visual experience can be exclusively focused 
on the object and its shape and colour, so exhausting its manifest content, or (ii) that one 
could imagistically recollect the full visual scene.  
Nevertheless, even granting the above, a detailed set of considerations provides an 
alternative to the Mode Intentionalist analysis of this example. The alternative claim the 
Strong Intentionalist needs to show is plausible is as follows: The relevant shape and colour 
property-senses in visual experience seem different, in some important respect, from the 
relevant shape and colour property-senses as presented in imagistic memory. As such the 
manifest content cannot be exactly the same.  
Here is one way of substantiating this claim. When in imagistic memory one re-presents 
to oneself – in the sense of attempting to again present oneself with – an object as having a 
specific shape or colour, one’s experiential acquaintance with the relevant property-sense 
lacks something that it has when it’s a visual property. What it lacks is phenomenal presence, 
understood as the property-sense seeming to be instantiated or exemplified, as seeming to 
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really exist now, or in the present. Property-senses, as presented in visual experience, have 
this feature of phenomenal presence, whereas it is lacking in imagistic memory. Imagistic 
memory does not present its objects and their properties as seeming to really exist now, or in 
the present, but as existing in the past. They lack phenomenal presence and could be said to 
be characterized by phenomenal absence.  
Importantly, for the Strong Intentionalist, this distinction needs to be construed as part 
of the manifest content of those experiences; it needs to be a distinctive aspectual dimension 
of the sensible profile of visual experiences contrasted with imagistic recollection. What more 
can we say in defence of this position, as a Strong Intentionalist account of the phenomenal 
presence/absence distinction? 
First, note that this distinction is a not matter of a cognitive state or judgement to the 
effect that the relevant object and its property is present vs absent. Instead, phenomenal 
presence is something which pertains to experience (likewise for phenomenal absence in the 
case of imaginative recollection). So, when phenomenal presence is framed as ‘the property-
sense seeming to be instantiated, as seeming to really exist now or in the present’, the seeming 
is supposed be a non-cognitive seeming tied to the phenomenal character of sense-perceptual 
experience. 
Granting the above, why we should construe the phenomenal presence/absence 
distinction as a matter of differences in content, as an aspectual dimension of the experiences 
rather than something that putatively fixes to the intentional mode?36 It bears noting that 
																																																						
36 An alternative would be as follows. Phenomenal presence can be understood in terms of the causal 
self-referentiality of perception, such that sense-perceptual experience involves a causal self-reflexivity 
which figure as clauses in its content (in one sense one might think of this as the ‘mode’ infusing the 
content, although see Schmitz 2018: 145-6 for some reservations on this score). As Searle puts it ‘the 
visual experience does not represent the causal relation as something existing independently of the 
experience, but rather part of the experience is the experience of being caused’ (1983: 112-140). 
Arguably this kind of analysis might also claim that the phenomenology of imagistic memory involves 
representing temporal and (earlier) perceptual relations to the remembered event (past causal relations 
figuring in the content). A general worry about this view is that it potentially undermines the 
transparency of perceptual experience (see Harman 1990; Tye 2002). If sense-perceptual experience 
involved a self-referential causal aspect in its content, then this would arguably obstruct the 
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overall intentional contents are complex. Perhaps one route to make sense of building 
phenomenal presence/absence into the content is to say that there can be aspectual 
qualifications of property-senses in experience (as kinds of senses of senses if you will). This 
might seem profligate in certain respects, but in contrasting visual experience and imagistic 
recollection we arguably come to recognize distinctive aspectual dimensions of content that 
are, for the most part, passed over imply because they are ‘ever-present’. In the case of sense-
perceptual experience, the aspectual qualification of property senses as phenomenally present is 
the standard fare. It is only in comparison with property-senses as manifest in imagistic 
recollection that we come to recognize a feature of the content of our sense-perceptual 
experiences which was ‘there all along’ but takes probing and contrasting to notice.   
However, the Mode Intentionalist might respond as follows. Building phenomenal 
presence into the aspectual shape of manifest content is a complex route to take. Isn’t it more 
plausible to opt for the simpler route and say the relevant phenomenal contrast in Example 4 
obtains in virtue of a non-content based difference, namely the phenomenologically manifest 
mode of vision vs that of imagistic memory, as per Mode Intentionalism?  
To see why, despite the apparent complexity, the Strong Intentionalist’s gloss on the 
phenomenal presence vs absence as above has plausibility let me consider a simpler case. 
Attend to something in your environment that looks red. Shut your eyes and attempt to 
imagistically recollect the same object as having the same colour. In doing so it is 
phenomenologically apparent – so the Strong Intentionalist says – that the property 
imagistically re-presented is aspectually (so contentfully) different from the property as seen. 
Here is the phenomenological claim which needs to be reflected in the analysis: the relevant 
																																																						
phenomenology of what seems like (what is experienced as) as direct relation. By constructing 
phenomenal presence as a way the object seems qua <the property-sense seeming to be instantiated, as 
seeming to really exist now, or in the present> we arguably can maintain transparency (see McDowell 
1991 and Soteriou 2000 173-189 for critical discussion). Alternatively, as Michael Schmitz (2013; 2017) 
argues – from within an Intentionalism about Modes view – that due to differences in the what Searle calls 
the direction of causation (say between intention and memory) it is questionable whether the relevant 
intentional states could be said to share contents. See section 5 for a more general discussion of 
Intentionalism about Modes  
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colour properties manifestly seem different in the different experiences. Far from having a 
red after-image of the object as the same float before one’s mind, or something approximating 
a visual hallucination of the same coloured object – as merely a different phenomenologically 
manifest mode of access to what seems like the same property – what we experience is in some 
sense a ‘pale shadow’ of it. Hence the idea that imagistic re-presentation of something, even 
that which is had directly after a visual experience, lacks the vivacity of the original visual 
experience. At least part of the explanation of why it does, on this view, would be because its 
content is different qua lacking the phenomenal presence characteristic of (and aspectually 
qualifying) property-senses as presented in visual experience. Instead those property-senses 
are experienced as phenomenally absent. In this sense the Strong Intentionalist might argue that 
despite the complexity of the analysis, it reflects something which is phenomenologically 
important. Further to this, they would charge the Mode Intentionalist with saying something 
counter-intuitive in cases like this; namely, that it really does seem like we are presented with 
exactly the same property, but merely have a different phenomenologically manifest mode of 
access to it.  
Further analysis of the contrast between the contents of visual experience and imagistic 
memory is not possible here.37 However, the Strong Intentionalist has some grounds for 
claiming that for two experiences to share exactly the same sensible profiles, then the relevant 
property-senses would have to share the same aspectual shape qua phenomenal presence vs 
absence. Insofar as two experiences diverge on this aspectual dimension, then they cannot be 
said to share exactly the same sensible profiles. So, in Example 4, it is not obvious that when 
engaging in imagistic recollection or memory what I enjoy is an intentional experience with a 
phenomenologically manifest different intentional mode, which has exactly the same manifest 
content as the visual experience of which it is a recollection. Instead, what arguably constitutes 
the difference between the cases, and putatively explains the phenomenal contrast, is arguably 
																																																						
37 Cf. Kriegel (2015: 245-76) for a Sartrean account of the contrast which appeals to intentional modes.  
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a phenomenologically manifest difference in the overall sensible profiles of the experiences 
themselves.  
At this stage, the Mode Intentionalist might concede the Strong Intentionalist part of the 
latter’s strategy. They could agree that in such phenomenal contrast cases there is plausibly 
always a difference in sensible profiles (and so manifest content). However, they will claim 
that such a difference can’t sufficiently explain the relevant phenomenological differences 
(even if they are necessary to doing so) – we need phenomenologically manifest intentional 
modes for that.38 But this concession involves abandoning the central aspect of Mode 
Intentionalism’s argumentative strategy (as expressed in Arg.1, specifically in P1) and results 
in begging the question. Let me explain.  
It was said in section 2 that phenomenologically manifest intentional modes (putatively) 
emerge as well-motivated postulates when considering phenomenal contrasts between pairs 
of experiences where it is prima facie plausible that the manifest content is the same. Insofar as 
manifest content is now also a variable across such cases, then it becomes considerably more 
difficult to substantiate the claim that intentional mode qua intentional mode makes a 
phenomenological difference. Furthermore, with that aspect of Arg.1 abandoned, we now 
need a different reason for thinking that a sufficient explanation of the phenomenal difference 
between contrast cases must include an appeal to a difference in a phenomenologically salient 
intentional mode. This cannot be assumed since that claim is just another way of asserting 
that Mode-Intentionalism is true. As such, the concession can’t be made without Arg.1 being 
abandoned, and so undercutting the motivation for the view.  
 
5. Intentionalism about Modes 
Before concluding let me provide reflections on a different approach to these issues that is 
worthy of comment, namely what I have called Intentionalism about Mode. To remind this reader 
this is the view that the relevant mode may not only make a phenomenological difference 
																																																						
38 See Crane 2001; 86; 2003: 21-22. 
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(such that phenomenal character is partly determined by mode), but also makes a difference 
to the intentional content of the relevant experience in a distinctive way. In other words, 
Intentionalism about Mode commits to a special kind of ‘mode-infused’ content. 
First, let me make a point about the dialectic of the paper. As we have seen, the Strong 
Intentionalist responses to the Mode Intentionalist consist is explaining phenomenal contrast 
cases by reference to (subtle) differences in content, where the notion of manifest content is 
as follows: The object presented, as it presented to the subject under a specific aspect. This 
notion of content excludes so-called ‘mode-infused’ content insofar as the latter is ostensibly 
a kind of content which doesn’t concern how the object of the experience is presented (see 
below). Nonetheless, the argument presented in the previous two sections, while perhaps 
sufficient to reject Mode Intentionalism, could be thought not sufficient (even via negativa) to 
motivate Strong Intentionalism, since there is an alternative explanation of the relevant 
phenomenal contrasts that does not appeal to (i) differences in manifest content as per Strong 
Intentionalism, or (ii) differences in phenomenologically manifest intentional modes as per 
Mode Intentionalism, but rather (iii) differences in supposed ‘mode-infused’ content as per 
Intentionalism about Modes. Given this, it is important to consider Intentionalism about Modes, since 
that allows for further clarification of whether the relevant phenomenal contrasts might admit 
of an alternative explanation. 
To get more traction we need to get clearer on so-called mode-infused content. What 
precisely is this special kind of content? First it is important to distinguish it from manifest 
content as defined above, as ‘what-content’ or ‘object-content’ as we might put it, as 
determining, in the sense-perceptual case, what is perceived.39 To make supposed ‘mode-content’ 
clearer, consider the following example. A patient suffering from a neurological impairment 
does not experience certain bodily movements as caused by himself. He often has visual 
experiences of his limbs moving, but not as caused by him. Say, for example, he enjoys a visual 
experience of seeing his arm rise. After successful brain surgery things are now different for him. 
																																																						
39 I thank a referee at Erkenntnis for suggesting this label. See Schmitz 2018: 146.  
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He now enjoys an experience of raising his arm. There is a phenomenal contrast here, and 
arguably this connects to the role of the subject as merely passive in the perceptual case (merely 
seeing the arm rise) in contrast to the active (or actional) role in case of raising his arm.  
Can such phenomenal differences be captured in terms of manifest content as ‘what-
content’ or ‘object-content’, as a way the object is presented to the subject under a specific 
aspect? Arguably not: We might think the passive vs active role that our subject plays with 
respect to seeing his arm rise vs raising his arm, is not part of what is perceived or what is done 
(the objects of the visual experience and the intentional action respectively). Instead, it 
connects to the very doing or perceiving itself. As such, the relevant differences arguably concern 
a representation of a mode-specific difference: in the passive case the subject represents that they 
are passive (or causally-inert) with respect to what is seen and in the active case the subject 
represents that the arm rising in physical space is caused by them. Given this, we might posit 
a distinctive kind of ‘mode-content’. As Schmitz, a defender of Intentionalism about Modes, puts 
it in a similar context: ‘In perceptual and actional experience, we experience our passive, 
respectively active, position toward the world…I represent this action from a position of 
directedness at causing it, of being committed and poised to cause it….’40 Generalising, mode-
content would concern how the subject experiences and represents its relation to the states of 
affairs and other objects in the world, that is how the subject is related to the object it perceived, 
remembers, intends etc.  
Intentionalism about Modes, marks out a view distinct from Mode Intentionalism (it could 
be held without any commitment to non-content based differences explaining phenomenal 
contrasts). While detailed consideration of this view was not my principle aim here, let me 
document reasons why we might nonetheless give pause for thought in committing to this 
kind of view.  
																																																						
40 See Schmitz 2018: 145-6. See also Recanati 2007: 127, 131-4 for a similar view, and a critique of 
Searle’s (1983) approach of building these aspects into the ‘what-content’, on the basis of a self-
referential causal component, which Recanati claims involves the fallacy of misplaced information.  
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First, in the action case matters are complex, but arguably the contrast as set up above is 
misleading. The relevant contrast should not be between a visual experience of one’s arm 
raising and a raising of one’s arm (i.e. perception vs perception plus intentional action), since the 
two experiences have a different overall manifest content (or ‘object-content’). They both 
have the same visual content, but the intentional action also has a manifest content related to 
the object of an intention. The more apt contrast might be compelled movement of limb vs ‘free’ 
movement of a limb, evincing a phenomenal contrast between things that happen to me vs 
things that happen because of me (as passive is a compelled way, vs active in an actional sense). 
But once so framed we are beyond the realm of sense-perception (and contrasts with it): The 
Strong Intentionalist’s arguments were only concerned with phenomenal contrasts cases 
involving sense-perception or its close cousins (visual imagination, imagistic memory etc). So 
while Intentionalism about Modes – ‘mode-content’ involving representing our own relations to 
objects and states of affairs – may be required to explain phenomenal contrasts concerning 
the passivity of events concerning the subject’s body which respect to which the agent is 
causally inert vs the ‘active’ actional character of intentional action, this doesn’t undermine 
the Strong Intentionalist take on sense-perceptual experience and its close cousins.  
As a second critical comment, Intentionalism about Modes takes on a specific theoretical cost. 
It implicates self-representational capacities insofar, by way of ‘mode-content’, the subject 
represents its own relation to states of affairs and other objects in the world. For example, in the 
visual case, Intentionalism about Modes would have it that the subject represents how it is related to 
the object it perceives, say that the (causal) relation is ‘passive’.  
Yet the idea that in reasonably basic cases of sense-perceptual experience, say vision, the 
subject represents either itself or facts about itself is at least contentious. A number of difficult 
questions arise for such a view: (i) do such self-representational capacities involve representing 
the relevant relations as thought-contents? If so, this implicates conceptual capacities too 
demanding for basic cases of sense-perception. For example, that whenever I see a red and 
round ball, I also represent that my relation to the object is passive by way of a judged mode-
 38 
content <my relation to the object is passive>, involving indexical, demonstrative and 
relational concepts.  
Alternatively, if these self-representational ‘mode-contents’ are intended to be non-
cognitive – as not involving theoretical thoughts about the relevant relations and differences 
– but are connected to how subjects experience, for example, the seeing itself (rather than what 
the seeing is of), we still implicate the idea that subjects have the capacity for a distinctive 
form of (perhaps non-conceptual) self-representation. Namely, that whenever I have a visual 
experience, I also represent my experience itself (the seeing) under certain aspects, say as being 
‘passive’. One might think that even this kind of self-representational complexity, as 
implicated by the positing mode-contents, is too complex.41 
Finally, given how Intentionalism about Modes has been framed it takes on the burden of 
explaining away the purported phenomenological transparency of sense-perceptual 
experience.42 The idea that sense perceptual experience in some sense represents itself as being a 
certain way (say representing my relation to the object of my perception as passive) potentially 
undermines its seeming to involve a direct, immediate non-inferential relation to the relevant 
object. If sense-perceptual experience involved such a representation of itself in its overall 
content, then this may obstruct the phenomenology of what seems like (what is experienced 
as) as direct relation.43  
While these final comments are conclusive in favour of Strong Intentionalism over 
Intentionalism about Modes they have provided some reasons for thinking preferring the Strong 
Intentionalist explanations of phenomenal contrasts offered in the bulk of this paper. 
Although I recognise that the case against Intentionalism about Modes would have to be made in 
more detail than has been possible in this final section. 
																																																						
41 See Perry 1986; Campbell 1994: 4.1; Evans 1982: 232-3 for criticism of the idea implicating such 
self-representation in sense-perceptual experience. The alternative view, that such self-representational 
capacities and de se contents are necessary finds varied expression in Hurley 1998: 207-47 and Bermudez 
1998: Ch.5. 
42 See Harman 1990; Tye 2002. 
43 see McDowell 1991 and Soteriou 2000 173-189 for discussion. 
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Conclusion 
This bulk of paper has shown that the kind of phenomenal contrast cases appealed to in 
support of Mode Intentionalism allow for interpretations which do not require positing 
intentional modes as phenomenologically salient aspects of sense-perceptual experience. As 
such, different arguments, or plausible responses to the criticisms surveyed here, are required 
if Mode-Intentionalism is to be a credible view of what determines the phenomenal character 
of sense-perceptual experience. Note thought, what is also required to complete the critique 
of Mode Intentionalism is an extension of the arguments and considerations levelled in the 
sense-perceptual cases to non-perceptual modes. Finally, Intentionalism about Modes was 
considering, and some reasons were provided for preferring Strong Intentionalism.  
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